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‘Living in shattered guise’:  





This article explores how Canto III of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage stages a process of 
self-division. Centring on the depiction of Napoleon and Wordsworth as doubles for 
Byron as poet, it suggests that the poem crafts doubles that deliberately fail to correlate 
with Byron’s self, consciously undermining an affected movement towards self-
transcendence. In doing so it argues for a reassessment of Byron’s use of the figure of 
the double, proposing that the poem offers ambivalent and fractured doublings inflected 
by Byron’s desire to present himself as a poet of imaginative mobility, formal ingenuity 




Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage Canto III subjects both quest and selfhood to scrutiny. It 
achieves this by manipulating the doubling trope within a set of Spenserian stanzas that hold 
true to Harold Bloom’s suggestion that quest, for the Romantics, is an ‘internalised’ process 
motivated by an ‘acute preoccupation with self’.1 Developing Bloom’s view, Greg Kucich 
emphasises how Byron’s readings of the Spenserian imitations of Beattie and Thomson 
prompted him to ‘associate the Spenserian heritage with self-division’.2 This influence is 
manifest in the way Byron uses quest-narrative to explore his own conflicted relationship 
with the self. Yet what the accounts of Bloom and, less so, Kucich risk downplaying is the 
poetry’s ability to perform this process of division, a quality that comes to the fore throughout 
the doubling of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage III. 
Though Alan Rawes and Mark Sandy have thoughtfully focused on Canto III as an 
exercise in forgetting,3 the poem’s proliferation of figures that act as potential doubles for 
Byron as poet suggests a quest for something more radical than forgetfulness. Affecting a 
drive towards leaving the Byronic self behind entirely, the poet presents not ‘everlasting 
centos of himself’,4 to quote Hazlitt’s complaint, but instead, in Napoleon and Wordsworth, a 
pair of selves that Byron might become. 5  Yet the intensity of this yearning for self-
transcendence jars with the poet’s acute awareness of the problems inherent in assuming an 
alternative self. Refusing to ignore or assuage such doubts, I want to argue that Byron adopts 
the technique of doubling only to repeatedly and deliberately sabotage his own designs, 
consciously undermining his claims to leave the self behind. Vincent Newey writes that 
‘Byron commits himself progressively to the extinction of any self prior to the word and the 
image, and chooses the freedom—and the instability—of living through others and in 
constantly changing guises’. 6  The poetry is, however, marked by a refusal to commit 
wholeheartedly to any such scheme. Deborah Forbes captures the duality of this movement in 
her description of the poem as ‘both sharply inward-turning and sharply outward-turning’,7 
usefully acknowledging Byron’s ability to blend introspective meditation and a drive beyond 
the self. Forbes frames her discussion of the poem’s ‘unrecognised doubles’ and 
‘unassimilated voices’ in terms of Harold’s inability ‘to recognise himself definitively in the 
fallen heroes, desolate landscapes and ruined buildings that he encounters on his travels’, a 
failure that is seen to parallel ‘Byron’s own refusal to identify himself completely with 
Harold’.8 Yet the way Byron prevents the invoked figures from ever cleanly meshing with the 
Byronic self suggests an alternative motive for this disrupted doubling, as individuals who 
might act as doubles for Byron become an opportunity for the poet to foreground virtues that 
are uniquely Byronic.  
In the case of Napoleon, Byron cites his own potential to become Napoleonic as 
evidence of an imaginative mobility that the fallen conqueror now lacks. When Canto III later 
moves to adopt Wordsworthian rhetoric, form acts as the crucial counter-balance to the poet’s 
drive beyond the self. Capitalising on the inherent discontinuities of the Spenserian stanza, 
Byron has form undermine content in order to affirm the impossibility of his assenting to a 
Wordsworthian notion of self. Focusing on these self-sabotaged doublings with Napoleon and 
Wordsworth as evidence of the kind of ‘conscious orchestration’ that Vincent Newey finds 
lacking in the canto,9 this essay will argue for the way Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage III allows 
Byron to position himself at the centre of his remodelled quest-romance. 
 
** 
Napoleon has long been regarded as one of Byron’s favourite doubles. John Clubbe posits 
him as the poet’s ultimate obsession, describing a man that ‘seize[d] Byron’s imagination 
more than any other living human being […] and never relinquish[ed] his grasp until Byron’s 
dying hour’.10 Simon Bainbridge foregrounds Napoleon’s centrality to the self-fashioning 
present throughout Byron’s oeuvre, explaining how the poet’s ‘struggle to grasp and 
formulate Napoleon’s political and imaginative meaning played an important part in his own 
continuous process of self-assessment and self-representation’. 11  However, if Childe 
Harold’s Pilgrimage shows Byron exploring the possibility of becoming Napoleonic as a 
route out of the Byronic self, Canto III sets out to complicate its already conflicted 
engagement with a notoriously complex individual. Byron’s effort to negotiate the dichotomy 
of poetry and action is central to this disruption. The distinction often occupies Byron’s 
thoughts; ‘Who would write, who had anything better to do?’,12 Byron comments archly in 
early 1813, followed swiftly by the declaration that ‘No one should be a rhymer who could be 
anything better’.13 This sentiment manifests itself more extremely in Byron’s claim that ‘I 
have no ambition; at least, if any, it would be aut Caesar aut nihil’,14 which, according to 
Jerome McGann, shows how Byron in early 1814 
 
still clung to a naïve conception of what constituted greatness of soul. Aut Caesar aut 
nihil he said for himself, thus insuring an impasse, and his nihilism. Poetry alone 
seemed to remain, and yet it rankled that this should be so. For poetry was nothing 
next to a life of action, and even if it were something, he was unfit for its tasks.15 
 
In describing poetry as ‘nothing’ to Byron, McGann maps the dichotomy of poetry and action 
onto aut Caesar aut nihil, equating poetry with nihil. Yet Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage III 
reveals a greater degree of ambivalence in Byron’s thinking. Though the portrait of Napoleon 
allows Byron to scrutinise aut Caesar aut nihil by questioning what it is to be Napoleonic and 
what it is to be nothing, it also reveals the poet muscling his way into this equation, in spite of 
Byron’s apparent effort to leave the self behind. Napoleon acts as a means for Byron to 
consider the possibility that while he might be nothing or he might be Napoleonic, he might 
also be irrevocably Byronic. The poem gestures towards reconciling the poetry and action 
dichotomy as a way of aligning Byron and Napoleon, but it also shows Byron embracing 
such a distinction as evidence that he, as poet, possesses qualities that Napoleon does not. In 
stanza 37 the doubling disintegrates at the point that Napoleon begins to resemble a failed 
Byronic poet, rather than Byron himself: 
 
Conqueror and captive of the earth art thou! 
She trembles at thee still, and thy wild name 
Was ne’er more bruited in men’s minds than now 
That thou art nothing, save the jest of Fame, 
Who wooed thee once, thy vassal, and became 
The flatterer of thy fierceness, till thou wert  
A god unto thyself; nor less the same 
To the astounded kingdoms all inert, 
Who deem’d thee for a time whate’er thou didst assert. (III, 37) 
 
For Deborah Forbes, ‘this description would apply equally well to Harold or to the reputation 
that Byron has made for himself, but he goes on to criticise Napoleon, without in any way 
implying that he applies these criticisms to himself’.16 Yet the stanza is more ambivalent and 
ambiguous than Forbes allows. Byron’s image of the fallen Napoleon as paradoxically both 
‘Conqueror and captive’ suggests that his demise has not entirely effaced his previous 
achievements, which, according to this stanza, lay in a capacity to create and dictate a version 
of the self to others. However, as the lines begin to blur critique with admiration, the poet 
vacillates between associating with and disassociating from the figure of Napoleon. With 
Byron experiencing unprecedented fame at the time of the poem’s composition, the rhyme of 
‘name’ and ‘Fame’ speaks to two undeniably Byronic concerns.17 While their presence in the 
portrait of Napoleon suggests a shared preoccupation with heritage and reputation, to be ‘the 
jest of Fame’ is a Byronic pose that is true of the self-surrendering Napoleon but less so of 
Byron at this time, despite him writing in the aftermath of the separation scandal of 1816.18 
While his description of a man who became ‘a god unto thyself’ has the air of a critique, 
Byron places greater stress on the fact that Napoleon’s belief in his own godly status was 
shared by his ‘astounded kingdoms’. The alexandrine celebrates a former version of 
Napoleon who had absolute control over what he was ‘deem’d’ to be and used this ability to 
facilitate his ascent.  
As the closing couplet suggests, language, or the ability to ‘assert’ one’s self through 
words, allows its agent to craft a self of their own making and in turn to render their foes 
‘inert’. In this opposition between ‘assert’ and ‘inert’, Byron comes teasingly close to 
collapsing his poetry-action dialectic by implying that utterance, the poet’s ultimate tool but 
here deployed by the quintessential man of action, is a powerful form of action in its own 
right. The sentiment gains additional potency from being housed in the increased articulatory 
space afforded by the alexandrine. Crucially, however, the couplet also recalls the rhyme’s 
previous iteration, ‘thou wert’, and this use of the past tense looms over the stanza, instilling 
Byron’s observations with an elegiac quality. The tone of the alexandrine, and ultimately the 
stanza as a whole, is dictated by ‘for a time’. Having refused to condemn the fact that 
Napoleon was ‘a god unto thyself’, the poet instead laments the cessation of Napoleonic 
assertion, deploring the loss of this power to ‘assert’ a god-like persona. The accusatory 
direct address of ‘Now / […] thou art nothing’, laden with bitterness and regret, resonates 
with the pronouncements of stanza 6 in its use of the term ‘nothing’, with the earlier stanza 
confirming that Byron, too, knows what it is to be ‘nothing’: 
 
’Tis to create, and in creating live   
A being more intense, that we endow  
With form our fancy, gaining as we give  
The life we image, even as I do now.  
What am I? Nothing; but not so art thou,  
Soul of my thought! (III, 6) 
 
Napoleon, at the peak of his powers, could be ‘whate’er [he] didst assert’, as if 
enacting the process described above: ‘’Tis to create, and in creating live / A being more 
intense’. Yet this is no longer the case. The resemblance between the two stanzas magnifies 
the impression that stanza 37 is honing in on Napoleon’s now diminished skills of self-
creation, but it also highlights the fact that though Byron and Napoleon are aligned through 
their mutual nothingness, they respond to their nothingness in fundamentally different ways. 
In the description of Napoleon as ‘Conqueror and captive’ (III, 37), the proximity of the word 
‘still’—‘She trembles at thee still’ (III, 37)—to the term ‘captive’ in the previous line imbues 
the temporal adverb ‘still’ with an adjectival sense of a physical ‘still[ness]’, characterising 
the dethroned emperor as an immobilised force. Napoleon seems to succumb to the very 
inertia that once paralysed his foes, presenting a stark contrast with the imaginative mobility 
attributed to the Byronic self. Whereas stanza 37 dishearteningly qualifies its ‘nothing’ by 
stating that Napoleon is ‘nothing, save the jest of Fame’ (III, 37), stanza 6 altogether more 
optimistically qualifies ‘nothing’ through the conjunction ‘but’, which acts as the catalyst for 
Byron’s envisioned movement beyond the self. ‘Gaining as [he] give[s]’ (III, 6), the poet’s 
self is shaped, in part, by his creation as it comes into being. Byron’s enjambed lines teem 
with activity and vigour through the use of the present tense ‘even as I do now’, enacting the 
interdependent process they describe. As it was in Canto III’s earlier image of the broken 
mirror that ‘makes / A thousand images of one that was’ (III, 33), creativity is the force that 
allows the self to ‘brokenly live on’ (III, 32). 
Jerome Christensen argues that the cult of Napoleon was indebted to ‘his own 
astonishing improvisations, his gifted impersonation of a monarch’,19  but when Michael 
O’Neill observes that stanza 6 ‘spurn[s] and send[s] packing identity as empirically fixed’ 
allowing it to emerge ‘as a “Nothing” crying out for imaginative and aesthetic 
replenishment’,20 he suggests a compelling reason for Byron’s rejection of Napoleon as a 
potential double. For Byron, Napoleon’s ultimate failure was, in his surrender, to stop 
creating, and to eschew the self’s demands for ‘imaginative and aesthetic replenishment’.21 
The poet of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage stops aspiring to be Napoleon not because of any 
belief that he as mere poet lacks the required ‘greatness of soul’,22 but upon the recognition 
that Napoleon ceased to ‘assert’ (III, 37) ‘the life we image’ (III, 6). If those who encountered 
Napoleon deemed him ‘whate’er [he] didst assert’ but only ‘for a time’ (III, 37), Byron 
differentiates himself from his potential double by claiming a continued ability to transcend 
nothingness through his apparently ceaseless creativity.  
Napoleon exemplifies the fate that will befall Byron, too, should he stop creating. As a 
result, Byron disrupts the pairing of himself and Napoleon not because of his own inability to 
be Napoleon or even because of Napoleon’s failure to be Napoleonic, but because of 
Napoleon’s failure to be Byronic. While McGann writes of Byron’s doubling that ‘Byron 
puts on a mask […] and seems to invite it to exert its own power over him’,23 here the 
opposite is true. The power of the mask is checked and challenged at every juncture. The 
poem’s drive beyond the self is stymied by Byron’s realisation that he does not want to 
become Napoleon, and a determination to succeed where Napoleon failed charges the quest 
of Canto III. If Forbes’s sense that Harold’s myopia renders him unable to draw lessons from 
Napoleon invites further discussion, her reading of the structural implications of this failed 
doubling is acute: ‘if Byron (or his surrogate Harold) were to explicitly recognise himself in 
one of the figures he invokes, the sequential finding of new counterparts—the substance of 
the narrative—would be arrested’.24 In fact, in its vacillating movements towards and away 
from the self, the incessant motion of Canto III is evidence that lessons have been learned 
from Byron’s portrait of Napoleon. Here, the Byronic quest exists in the ongoing process of 
questing rather than the reaching of any final destination; to settle on such a resting point 
would render one susceptible to the kind of shackles that the ‘still’ Napoleon must now 
endure (III, 37). 
 
*** 
While Napoleon exemplifies the poet’s uneasy edging towards, even as he seems to drift 
away from, each of the historical figures that appear throughout Canto III, it is Wordsworth 
who, as a fellow Romantic poet, represents Byron’s most challenging potential double. 
Wordsworth is not subject to the kind of ambivalent but partially distanced portraiture seen in 
Byron’s responses to Napoleon and Rousseau. Though this doubling shares the half-formed 
quality seen in Byron’s fractious coupling with Napoleon, Wordsworth occupies an 
altogether more complex position in the poem. This owes to Byron’s decision in stanzas 71-
76 to more directly embody his double by speaking in a register indebted to that of 
Wordsworth’s own poetry. The assumption of a quasi-Wordsworthian voice suggests that 
Wordsworth should, regardless of any antipathy between the poets, be read as one of the 
numerous ‘maskings’ that McGann finds present throughout Byron’s oeuvre. McGann argues 
that 
  
because [Byron’s] figurae are consciously manipulated masks, one has to read them 
[…] in terms of a “sameness with difference.” The poetry lies exactly in the relation, 
in the dialectical play between corresponding apparitional forms: on one side, the 
spectacular poet, […] on the other, the various fictional and historical selvings.25 
 
Yet this discussion of ‘corresponding forms’ implies a clean-cut quality to Byron’s doublings 
that is not borne out by the poetry. Byron’s adoption of Wordsworth’s voice creates an 
ambivalent and ambiguous blurring of himself and Wordsworth that destabilises any reading 
based on the principle of ‘sameness with difference’, complicating McGann’s readiness to 
draw a line between ‘the poet’ and his ‘various selvings’. 
Contemporary reviewers commit a similar misreading in suggesting that Canto III houses 
Wordsworth and Byron as two distinct presences. John Wilson’s 1817 review echoes the 
sentiments of Francis Jeffrey, who reads Canto III not as Byron attempting to become 
Wordsworth but as him successfully confronting Wordsworth on Wordsworth’s own terms.26 
Wilson argues that Byron ‘came into competition with Wordsworth upon his own ground, 
and with his own weapons; and in the first encounter he vanquished and overthrew him’.27 
This claim misleadingly posits Byron as the victor of this encounter, failing to account for the 
tensions of poetry that, despite its Wordsworthian inflections, is shot through with 
equivocation. Rather than going to war with Wordsworth, Byron more subtly undercuts the 
Lake poet’s rhetoric by wearing his mask, as is evident in the following lines: 
 
I live not in myself, but I become 
Portion of that around me; and to me,  
High mountains are a feeling, but the hum 
Of human cities torture: I can see  
Nothing to loathe in nature, save to be 
A link reluctant in a fleshly chain, 
Class’d among creatures, when the soul can flee, 
And with the sky, the peak, the heaving plain 
Of ocean, or the stars, mingle, and not in vain. (III, 72) 
 
The poet dons the mask but in doing so he points up the fact that this is and only ever will be 
a mask; one that will never correspond fully with Byron’s poetic self. The mask seems ill-
fitting; despite a strongly affirmative opening statement that might set the tone for the poetry 
to follow, what gains prominence here is the persistence of Byron’s qualifications. Veering 
between the curiously over-assertive and the strangely tentative, the poet betrays his 
discomfiture with his subject matter as early as the second line, which stumbles through its 
heavy caesura into the inelegant repetition of ‘around me; and to me’. Metrical stresses 
appear to enact a process of self-formation, with the shift from the unstressed initial ‘me’ to 
the stressed ‘me’ of the final syllable suggesting the growth enabled by an embrace of the 
natural world.28 This movement from unstressed self to stressed self broadly mimics the 
conceptual movement of The Prelude, Wordsworth’s ‘poem on the growth of my own 
mind’,29 but the fact that Byron condenses the formative experience of Wordsworthian epic 
into just four syllables knowingly invites scrutiny in its brevity and superficiality. The 
emphasis placed on the individualised nature of Byron’s perceptions through the repetition of 
‘me’, seen again in the subsequent iteration of the b rhyme ‘I can see’, jars against the way 
that the poet, in these stanzas, is reaching beyond that which comes naturally to him, as if 
trying to see through someone else’s eyes. Settling on the rather gnomic declaration that ‘to 
me, / High mountains are a feeling’, the lines grope vainly towards a kind of Wordsworthian 
profundity.  
Yet the absence of descriptive clarity means this statement fails to convince. While such 
a formulation might be defended as indicating the ineffability of the poet’s love for ‘high 
mountains’, to label mountains as a ‘feeling’ seems carelessly but deliberately nonchalant. 
The impression is of Byron paraphrasing a poet whom Hazlitt celebrates as poet of the 
mountains and Shelley calls ‘Poet of Nature’.30 The claim that ‘I can see / Nothing to loathe 
in nature’ more openly invites suspicion through its negative structure, which implies that the 
poet is actively seeking reasons to spurn nature, as well as the term ‘loathe’, which seems 
overly charged in the context of a denial. The listing syntax of the final couplet renders the 
alexandrine cumbersome, stifled by the delaying of the sentence’s main verb, ‘mingle’. As 
the verb gets lost in the irregular, lumbering rhythm of this elongated line, there is the sense 
that its agent, the poet, is himself merely an afterthought, an insignificant speck in the 
vastness of ‘the sky, the peak’ and ‘the heaving plain / Of ocean’. The connotations of 
‘mingle’ capitalise on this implied disjunction. In this context, to ‘mingle’ is not to be fully 
integrated, disrupting the earlier more confident claim that ‘I become / Portion of that around 
me’. In a move typical of the canto, the demands of form appear to place Byron under duress, 
with the additional syllables of the alexandrine creating additional space for prevarication. 
With the line petering out into a meek qualification that this mingling will not be ‘in vain’, 
this apparently defiant alexandrine, like the stanza as a whole, collapses suspiciously easily 
under any kind of critical inspection. Byron resists the mask of Wordsworth even as he seems 
to embrace it, with the lines affecting embodiment but actually committing only to 
ventriloquism. Carefully positioning himself outside of a perspective he initially seems to 
endorse, Byron’s effort to transcend the self is undercut by an apparently deliberate failure to 
attain Wordsworth’s style. 
Thomas Moore writes that Wordsworth objected to these stanzas on the grounds that ‘the 
feeling of natural objects which is there expressed, [was] not caught by [Byron] from nature 
herself, but from [Wordsworth] and spoiled in the transmission’.31 The notion that these 
sentiments are ‘spoiled in transmission’ is vital to the writing and illuminates Byron’s method. 
Form proves vital in disrupting the apparent affinities between Byron and his ‘corporeal 
enemy’, to use Jerome McGann’s phrase.32 With the Lake School having ‘popularised blank 
verse as the vehicle of natural feeling’,33 Byron’s choice of the Spenserian stanza colours his 
engagement with nature with a sharply Byronic hue. Wordsworth’s own attitude towards the 
form was ambivalent. ‘The Female Vagrant’ reveals a desire to attune the Spenserian 
measure with the rusticity and simplicity prized by his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, which 
bemoans poets who ‘indulge in arbitrary and capricious habits of expression, in order to 
furnish food for fickle tastes, and fickle appetites, of their own creation’.34 Despite his praise 
for a ‘fine structure of verse’, Wordsworth’s letter to Catherine Grace Godwin laments her 
decision to model her writing on ‘the broken and more impassioned movement’ of Byronic 
Spenserianism, arguing that ‘it is a form of verse ill adapted to conflicting passions; and it is 
not injustice to say that the stanza is spoiled in Lord Byron’s hands; his own strong and 
ungovernable passions blinded him as to its character’.35  
Though unduly critical in suggesting that Byron’s style is gratuitously uncontrolled, 
Wordsworth correctly identifies the emphases on ‘conflict’ and rupture that contribute to 
Canto III’s deliberate tendency towards division. That such techniques prevail throughout the 
poem’s invocation of Wordsworth suggests that despite his desire to transcend the self and 
adopt Wordsworthian rhetoric, Byron is refusing to abandon his own poetic territory. The 
resulting clash allows Byron to achieve his fullest realisation of the link between the 
Spenserian heritage and self-division, seen by Greg Kucich as central to the Romantic 
engagement with Spenser.36  The Byronic inclination towards disrupted doubling and the 
Wordsworthian emphasis on man’s harmony with nature bleed into one another, so that 
opposing drives towards unity and self-division become ‘antithetically mixt’ (III, 36). Rather 
than simply staging a clash between Byron as he is now and Byron as he would like to be, 
Canto III presents the fractious encounter of two competing projects of self-representation; 
Byron’s desire to be Wordsworthian collides with the poetry’s need to refute the 
Wordsworthian model of representing the self.37 
The movement between stanzas 72 and 73 demonstrates this conflict. Seeming to force 
square pegs into round holes, Byron uncomfortably accommodates Wordsworthian poetics 
within the fabric of his own poetry: 
 
And thus I am absorb’d, and this is life: 
I look upon the peopled desart past, 
As on a place of agony and strife, 
Where, for some sin, to Sorrow I was cast, 
To act and suffer, but remount at last 
With a fresh pinion; which I feel to spring, 
Though young, yet waxing vigorous, as the blast  
Which it would cope with, on delighted wing, 
Spurning the clay-cold bonds which round our being cling. (III, 73) 
 
John Hughes, an eighteenth-century editor of Spenser, spotlights the inherently fractured 
quality of the Spenserian stanza implied by George Saintsbury38 in commenting that ‘the 
same Measure, closed always by a full Stop, in the same Place, by which every Stanza is 
made as it were a distinct Paragraph, grows tiresom by continual Repetition, and frequently 
breaks the Sense, when it ought to be carry’d on without Interruption’. 39  This remark, 
alongside O. B. Hardison’s suggestion that the form ‘segment[s] […] narrative into arbitrary 
chunks’,40 illuminates Byron’s method. Far from ‘arbitrary’, however, ‘segment[ing]’ is here 
a deliberate artistic technique, as the poet uses the contours of the Spenserian stanza to 
disrupt the progression of his poetry. Given that this immediately follows the previous 
assertion that Byron will ‘mingle, and not in vain’, the opening line of this stanza, ‘and thus I 
am absorb’d’, seems a false and illogical leap, one accentuated by the stanza gap, as if the 
poet is claiming a victory that he has yet to truly achieve. The presumptuous ‘thus’ assumes 
that the poetry has demonstrated the absorption it describes, but the line’s conclusive tone 
makes it oddly out of place as an opening to a stanza, standing out in a manner that might not 
be so apparent in continuous blank verse. If taken at face value as an indicator that 
transcendent aspirations have been fulfilled, the proclamation seems better suited to the final 
line of the stanza, if not the entire poem. 
The opening line of stanza 73 has consequently been called ‘the most unconvincing 
Byron ever wrote’ by Jerome Christensen, who sees it as abbreviating ‘the Wordsridgean 
doctrine of the “one life”’ with typical ‘Byronic negligence’.41 However, Michael O’Neill 
writes engagingly on the way the line’s failure to convince ‘is its dramatic justification’, with 
the upbeat emphases that fall on ‘this’ and ‘life’ failing to disguise a ‘downbeat inflection, as 
though to say, “And this is “life”, this process of needing to escape from what I know only 
too well as “life”’.42 This implausibility is crucial to Byron’s intended effect. Groping for 
conclusion and for comfortable sanctuary beyond the self, Byron implies that he has 
successfully become a Wordsworthian poet: ‘and thus I am absorb’d’ (III, 73). Yet the air of 
prematurity that accompanies the line’s arrival renders its achievement facile, staining 
Byron’s evocation of Wordsworth with an air of condescension. In defining Byron as ‘a 
lordly writer’ who ‘is above his own reputation, and condescends to the Muses with a 
scornful grace’, Hazlitt captures this aspect of Byron’s tone, 43  but Canto III suggests a 
condescension borne out of poetic difference rather than class-consciousness or ‘aristocratic 
individualism’. 44  The poem’s emphasis on a disruption antithetical to Wordsworthian 
synthesis positions the quest of Canto III in a post-Wordsworthian landscape. Its treatment of 
Wordsworth is not straightforwardly derisive. Rather, implicit in these stanzas is Byron’s 
belief that he is too great to become Wordsworth or to succumb to the delusion of unifying 
with nature, regardless of his own yearning for self-transcendence. ‘Could he have kept his 
spirit to that flight / He had been happy’ (III, 14); though Byron wishes he could suspend his 
disbelief and commit to such a ‘flight’, he presents himself as possessing greater knowledge 
than the ‘Poet of Nature’,45 and the effect of the writing commands assent. As the alexandrine 
sets up only to qualify the possibility of transcending earthly ‘clay’ within a single line, the 
poet juxtaposes a defiant ‘spurning’ with tacit recognition that mortal bonds will inevitably 
always ‘cling’ (III, 73).  
Byron spotlights the antonymic relationship of these two heavily stressed verbs by using 
them to bookend the alexandrine through internal rhyme, typifying the insistent self-negation 
that Vincent Newey identifies in this section of the poem.46 Gradually building throughout 
the preceding three lines in ‘spring’, ‘waxing’ and ‘wing’ (III, 73), the sound of the 
proliferated c rhyme overbearingly ‘cling[s]’ to the stanza, culminating in the double ringing 
out of ‘being cling’. With this repetition comes a sense of shackling that undermines the 
vision of flight, recalling stanza fourteen’s description of ‘the link / That keeps us from yon 
heaven which woos us to the brink’ (III, 14). There, as transcendent aspirations are forced 
into battle with the limits imposed by form, the alexandrine flaunts its ability to accommodate 
the twists and turns of a poem that seems to engage in questing even as it questions the 
legitimacy of quest. Likewise, even in Byron’s invocation of Wordsworth, the act of 
recalibrating Spenser’s nine-line stanza redirects the spotlight to the resourcefulness and 
individuality of Byron as poet.47 By continuing to ‘cling’ to his own artistic blueprint, Byron 
confirms the link between himself and Wordsworth as the product of a ‘broken mirror’ (III, 
33), rather than a viable doubling that might allow him to leave the self behind. 
Earlier in Canto III Byron muses that ‘there are wanderers o’er Eternity / Whose bark 
drives on and on, and anchored ne’er shall be’ (III, 70). The enjambment suggests the poet’s 
own proclivity for such a ‘wander[ing]’ beyond the self, as seen in his encounters with 
Napoleon and Wordsworth, and the technique is mirrored in stanza 42’s account of those who 
cannot ‘tire / Of aught but rest’ and possess ‘a fire / And motion of the soul which will not 
dwell / In its own narrow being’ (III, 42). However, rather than offering merely a self-
reflexive celebration of Byronic mobility, these run-on lines, in their air of obligation and 
momentary flicker of frustration with the soul’s stubborn refusal to ‘dwell’, instead come to 
reveal Byron’s ambivalence towards his own existential wanderings. Swirling dizzyingly 
around ‘the arena of self-consciousness’,48 the quest of Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage funnels 
the poet back and forth, this way and that, initially away from but always back towards the 
self he wishes to transcend. Yet this does not represent defeat. The trajectory of Canto III is 
aptly reflected in Byron’s exclamation from Canto IV: ‘But my soul wanders; I demand it 
back / To meditate amongst decay, and stand / A ruin amidst ruins’ (IV, 25). It is by the 
poet’s own design that the poem impedes his affected march beyond that which is Byronic, 
and Byron eschews nihilism in presenting his discovery that ‘there woos no home, nor hope, 
nor life, save what is here’ (IV, 105). Having proposed a pair of potential doubles that only 
ever remain half-formed, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage III instead affirms the sovereignty of 
the self that endures through all of Byron’s travails, like the broken heart, ‘living in shattered 
guise’ (III, 33). In the act of swerving away from potential doubles, imaginative mobility, 
formal ingenuity and intellectual independence become the hallmarks of a distinctly Byronic 
poetic self. 
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